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THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST AND THE ATTORNEY/CLIENT
PRIVILEGES AS THEY ARISE IN CIVIL RIGHTS DISPUTES
Lewis M Wasserman
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for evi-
dentiary privileges in federal practice.' Many people incorrectly as-
sume there is a statutory scheme connected to evidentiary privileges
in federal court. Although each of the fifty states has a statutory
scheme of evidentiary rules, particularly relating to privileges, the
federal courts do not.2 Rather, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence directs that "federal common law" applies.3 Accordingly, in
order to determine whether a privilege exists, and whether that privi-
lege has been waived, it is necessary to look to the federal case law.
This can be problematic for litigators, particularly when they are
dealing with people who expected to retain an evidentiary privilege
based on state rules, but then ended up in federal court.4
This article briefly reviews the elements of the psychotherap-
ist-patient and attorney-client privileges and how these privileges
. Assistant Professor, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies, Virginia Tech School of
Education. J.D., 1983, St. John's University School of Law. Ph.D., Psychology, Hofstra
University, 1974. In 1984, Wasserman founded Wasserman Steen L.L.P., which specialized
in public school law and civil rights litigation, and where he practiced law for twenty-three
years.
1 FED. R. EVID. 501.
2 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996) (noting that it is usually appropriate for
federal courts to recognize a privilege under Rule 501 where, as in the case of the psychothe-
rapist privilege, the "50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted into law some form
of psychotherapist privilege").
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (applying attorney-client pri-
vilege, "the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common
law" pursuant to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allowing federal courts to apply
common law when considering privileges).
4 Although Rule 501 provides that federal common law governs federal question cases
and state law governs privileges on state law claims, there is disagreement over how to re-
solve privileges when the concurrent federal and state claims are brought in federal court.
The prevailing view is that federal law will control all claims. See generally Martin A.
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may be waived in the context of federal civil rights litigation.
I. THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST PRIVILEGE
Any discussion about the psychotherapist privilege has to start
with Jaffee v. Redmond.s This 1996 Supreme Court case established
a psychotherapist-patient privilege within federal courts.6 When ana-
lyzing whether the privilege exists in any given circumstance, there
are three elements that need to be considered. First, the communica-
tion may be privileged where it is between a licensed therapist and a
patient.' At the time Jaffee was decided, the circuit courts were not
in agreement as to whether federal courts should recognize the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege.8 Jaffee recognized the privilege and
extended it to licensed or certified social workers.9 Under Jaffee
three types of therapy privileges may be recognized in federal prac-
tice based on the issuance of a license.10
The second element requires that the communications must
relate to diagnosis or treatment." And third, the communication
must be made with an expectation of confidentiality.12 These three
conditions are the analytic framework of this discussion.
Prior to Jaffee, many circuit court decisions applied a balanc-
ing test to determine if the privilege applied; the courts weighed the
benefit to the patient and need for therapy and confidentiality against
518 U.S. at 4 (determining whether statements during "counseling sessions are protected
from compelled disclosure," in this case counseling sessions between a therapist and a police
officer).
6 Id. at 9-10 ("[T]he question we address today is whether a privilege protecting confiden-
tial communications between a psychotherapist and her patient 'promotes sufficiently impor-
tant interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence . . . .' Both 'reason and expe-
rience' persuade us that it does." (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
7 Jaffee, 518 U.S at 15.
8 Id. at 7.
9Id. at 3-4, 15.
'o Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15-16 (holding that the privilege applying to psychiatrists and psy-
chologists "should apply with equal force to treatment by a [licensed] clinical social work-
er").
" See id at 10 (describing that the purpose of the privilege is to encourage confidence and
trust in the therapist so that a "patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of
facts, emotions, memories, and fears" for the purpose of diagnosis, thus communication re-
lating to diagnosis or treatment should be protected to promote trust and confidence).
12 Id. (suggesting patients would be discouraged from talking freely with their therapists if
there was no expectation of privacy or confidentiality).
580 [Vol. 26
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 2, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss2/11
2010] ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 581
the broad societal interest in ascertaining the truth. 13 However, Jaffee
made it clear that the privilege is absolute.14 Accordingly, if the ele-
ments of the privilege are satisfied, then the privilege exists and no
judicial balancing is required.' 5 Whether the privilege is waived after
it comes into existence is a separate legal question.16
There have been arguments made that the psychotherapist-
privilege is so fundamental that it rises to a constitutional liberty in-
terest.' 7 However, courts have frequently shunned any argument that
communications to a therapist are constitutionally protected.' In
other words, to those courts it is only a rule of evidence that can be
changed.' 9 By contrast, courts have consistently found a constitu-
tional liberty interest implicated by the attorney-client privilege. 20
One common issue in a psychotherapist situation concerns in-
stances where communications from the patient fall outside of the li-
censure of the therapist. For example, it is very common in police
excessive force cases-where an officer shoots a person-for de-
partment rules to require the officer to enter treatment or counseling
13 See, e.g., In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he privilege amounts only
to a requirement that a court give consideration to a witness's privacy interests as an impor-
tant factor to be weighed in the balance in considering the admissibility of psychiatric histo-
ries or diagnoses."); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[P]rivilege . . . is de-
termined by balancing the interests protected by shielding the evidence sought with those
advanced by disclosure.").
14 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17-18 (describing the balancing test as an "eviscerat[ion] [ofj the
effectiveness of the privilege").
" Id. at 17.
16 Id. at 15 n.14. ("[T]he patient may of course waive the protection.").
17 See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing argument
made seeking constitutional protection for patient-doctor communication on the basis that
compelling a doctor to testify as to the treatment is a constitutional violation of privacy).
" Id. at 1031.
19 Id. ("[T]here is no constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege, only a federal evi-
dentiary one.").
20 See, e.g., In re Napster, Inc., 479 F.3d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The attorney-client
privilege protects fundamental liberty interest."). Due to the importance of the attor-
ney/client privilege, if there is an invasion of the privilege, either by government informants
or by workplace rules relinquishing the privilege, there may be constitutional issues and/or a
§ 1983 action, depending on the case. See, e.g., United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1067
(3d Cir. 1996) (noting that in order to raise a constitutional claim due to the invasion of the
attorney-client privilege by the government, the claimant must satisfy the following ele-
ments: "(1) the government's objective awareness of an ongoing, personal attorney-client
relationship between its informant and the defendant; (2) deliberate intrusion into that rela-
tionship; (3) actual and substantial prejudice"); United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 742
(5th Cir. 1986) (finding that the government impermissibly obtained evidence through a
government informant in violation of the attorney-client privilege).
3
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after a death ensues. This workplace requirement serves the purpose
of helping the police officer individually, as well as serving the police
department as an entity. 21 The communication between the police of-
ficer and the counselor possesses characteristics of conventional ther-
apy, and for all intents and purposes is therapy. The problem is that,
very often, police departments hire people who are not licensed the-
rapists within the particular state jurisdictional rules. 22 If the com-
munication with the therapist falls outside of the licensure for exam-
ple, as with a marriage and family therapist, then the police officer
may not be able to claim the psychotherapist privilege.23
However, there may be another way to protect the communi-
cations. There is another doctrine in psychotherapy privilege law,
called the "quasi-therapist doctrine."24 If the police officer, in a post-
shooting situation, communicates with a person that she reasonably
believes is a licensed psychiatrist, social worker, or psychologist and
the elements of the privilege are otherwise satisfied, those communi-
cations may be shielded by the quasi-therapist doctrine. 25
It is important in establishing the privilege that its proponent
include facts supporting the three elements required for the therapist
privilege, as well as assert a reasonable belief that the counselor was
a licensed therapist and the circumstances under which the belief
arose. After all, if the police department sends an officer to see a
psychotherapist, it is reasonable for the officer to believe that the per-
son was licensed and or certified.
One of the elements of the psychotherapist-patient relation-
ship is confidentiality. 26 However, a common argument is that if a
police officer receives treatment from a therapist, say a psychologist,
21 See Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(discussing a police officer who as a county employee was required to attend psychological
evaluations after he was involved in a shooting).
22 Id. at 1109.
23 Id. at I110 (indicating that counselors who specialize in marriage counseling, for exam-
ple, have a limited scope of practice, the may participate only in the "practice of marriage,
family, and child counseling[;]" therefore, if the communications are outside the scope of
their practice, the privilege does not apply).
24 Id. at 1114.
25 Id. (discussing the ability to seek protection under the quasi-therapist-patient privilege
when a patient reasonably believed treatment was provided by a licensed psychotherapist but
was mistaken).
26 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 (illustrating that the psychotherapist and psychologist privilege
extends to confidential communications).
582 [Vol. 26
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and knows in advance that the report from the psychologist is going
back to the police sergeant, lieutenant, or captain, there could be no
expectation of confidentiality and no privilege could arise.27 There
are different rules regarding confidentiality in police departments
throughout the country and they may implicate different outcomes for
an assertion of the privilege.28 Some police departments state that the
department is only interested in information concerning the officer's
ability to return to duty.29 Others have rules requiring that the report,
the contents of the report, and what was communicated to the therap-
ist all be made available to the department.30
In analyzing these types of cases, the particulars of the de-
partmental regulations and the information that was given to the po-
lice officer must be examined.3 1 For example, a police officer might
not have been informed as to whether or not communications with
the therapist would be confidential. If the police officer reasonably
believed that the communications made during therapy sessions were
confidential, the officer may be able to claim a privilege if a § 1983
claim arises. In this regard it is important to look at the police union
contract to determine what knowledge or expectation a police officer
might have before beginning counseling sessions with a therapist.
Depending on the language in the contract, there might be a waiver of
confidentiality that would otherwise exist.
Another problem that arises is the patient's communications
with third parties.32 There are situations where the police officer, for
example, will talk with the therapist, but also with a union representa-
27 Speaker, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-17 (knowing communications with a therapist that
would otherwise be privileged will be distributed to a third party demonstrates that there is
no reasonable expectation of confidentiality thus there is no privilege).
28 See id. (explaining that the police officer in this case, unlike police officers in other cas-
es, had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality because he was told that his discussions
and sessions with the counselor would remain confidential).
29 See Melissa L. Nelken, The Limits ofPrivilege: The Developing Scope ofFederal Psy-
chotherapist-Patient Privilege Law, 20 REv. LITIG. 1, 13 (2000) (considering whether privi-
lege should still apply when a psychiatrists is "not to disclose any psychiatric records or any
confidential communications from the officer to the department" but only make a recom-
mendation whether or not they are fit to return to work).
30 Speaker, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
31 Id. at 1116-17 (describing that a patient's expectation of privacy and the circumstances
surrounding the session must be considered in order to determine whether or not the privi-
lege applies).
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tive about the same things as the therapist. 33 Clearly, in this situation,
the communication is no longer confidential and the privilege is
waived.3 4
Another confidentiality issue arises when parents attend the
therapy sessions of their children.35 Frequently, a parent will accom-
pany her child to a therapy session for support and the child knows
that the parent will hear what she says. In that situation, a number of
cases have held that the presence of the third-party parent does not
constitute a waiver.36
A similar situation that might arise under the psychotherapist-
patient privilege is group therapy. For example, there are civil rights
cases where the victim of sexual harassment in a gender discrimina-
tion case may enter into group therapy. 37 The question becomes
whether there is a waiver due to the presence of third parties.3 8 The
general rule is that the psychotherapist-patient privilege can be pre-
served in group therapy.3 9 Although it is not uniform among all ju-
33 See Administrative Investigations of Police Shootings and Other Critical Incidents: Of-
ficer Statements and Use ofForce Reports Part Two: The Basics, Employment Law Section,
AELE Mo. L. J., Aug. 2008, at 203 (illustrating that while officers are discouraged from dis-
cussing events of a shooting they were involved in with other officers, they are encouraged
to see a psychiatrist and may discuss the events with family or a union representative).
34 Speaker, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-17 (describing that there can be no expectation of pri-
vacy and confidentiality when communications are disclosed to third parties).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Whitney, No. 05-40005-FDS, 2006 WL 2927531, at *3 (D.
Mass. Aug. 11, 2006) (describing that the presence of third parties generally destroys pa-
tient-therapist privilege, however if a parent is present during such his or her child's counsel-
ing session, the privilege is usually not considered destroyed or waived).
36 Grosslight v. Super. Ct., 72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 506 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1977) ("Where,
for example, the communication to the parent is to firther the child's interest in communica-
tion with, or is necessary for transmission of information to, a lawyer, a physician, or a psy-
chotherapist, the communication is protected by the pertinent statutory privilege.").
n Minnesota v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1984) (reasoning that all
members of the group seeking therapy "are part of the diagnostic and therapeutic process for
co-participants").
3 See UNIF. R. EvID. 503(a)(5). Defining a psychotherapist as
a person authorized in any State or country, or reasonably believed by
the patient to be authorized, to practice medicine, while engaged in the
diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including ad-
diction to alcohol or drugs, or a person licensed or certified under the
laws of any State or country, or reasonably believed by the patient to be
licensed or certified, as a psychologist, while similarly engaged.
Id. See Andring, 342 N.W.2d at 133 (raising the question of whether other patients in group
therapy destroys the privilege).
3 Andring, 342 N.W.2d at 134 ("An interpretation which excluded group therapy from
the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege would seriously limit the effectiveness of
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 2, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss2/11
ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE
risdictions, there exists a strong argument that the privilege should
apply to communications made in group therapy. 40
A. The "Dangerous Patient Exception"
There are a surprising number of cases where a patient receiv-
ing psychotherapy threatens serious violence against a specified per-
son. The threshold issue in such cases is whether, under state law,
the therapist has a duty to disclose those statements to the putative
target, or others who can protect that target, at least where the threats
are credible. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,41
the seminal case on this issue, the California Supreme Court held that
if a patient threatens to harm or kill someone, the therapist has a duty
to disclose that communication either to the intended victim, to a po-
lice officer, or to a person that is in a position to protect the intended
victim. 42 The courts are in universal agreement that a therapist may
communicate with the intended victim without violating ethical stan-
dards and in terms of fulfilling her duty under state tort law.43
Since the therapist's disclosure to protect a target is permissi-
ble or even required under state law, where the'threat is a serious one,
the question arises as to whether the therapist may be compelled to
testify in judicial proceedings about those threats made in the course
of diagnosis or treatment. The Circuit Courts are divided on this con-
troversial issue. The Fifth Circuit has held that the psychotherapist-
patient privilege does not attach when the therapist has previously
advised the patient about the therapist's duty to disclose those threats
to protect the target, since the patient had no expectation of confiden-
tiality concerning the communications.4 4 The Sixth45 and Ninth4 6
group psychotherapy as a therapeutic device.").
40 See, e.g., Farrell v. Super. Ct., 250 Cal. Rptr. 525, 527-28 (Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1988)
(holding that participants in group therapy were present to facilitate the treatment of each
other and the privilege was not waived); Cabrera v. Cabrera, 580 A.2d 1227, 1234 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1990) (holding that presence of a spouse at a therapy session did not constitute a
waiver of the privilege).
4' 551 P.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
42 Id. at 340.
43 See, e.g., Michael Ariens, "Playing Chicken": An Instant History of the Battle Over
Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 239, 255 (2009).
4 See United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
75 (2009) (holding that since defendant had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality
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Circuits have held that there is no automatic "dangerous patient" ex-
ception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, apparently requiring
an express waiver by the patient before the therapist may testify
against the patient as to the threats the patient made in therapy. The
Tenth Circuit has held that there is a dangerous-patient exception to
the privilege, but whether the exception applies may require findings,
including the therapist's testimony, as to the seriousness of the
threat.47 The Second Circuit has not addressed this particular issue.
Since threats of violence to a federal official are a crime and
the therapist may be the only witness to the crime, prosecution of the
defendant will necessarily depend on the circuit in which events
arose. This may lead to uneven application of justice as applied to
the prosecution of such crimes. Where an automatic dangerous-
patient exception does not apply, the admissibility of the patient's
statements to the therapist may depend on the clarity of the notice
given to the patient and its details as applied to the facts of the case.48
Moreover, there may be issues concerning the patient's competency.
For example, if the patient's comprehension and judgment are im-
paired, that person may not understand the warning given by the the-
rapist. At the beginning of therapy, a psychotherapist should never-
theless give clear notice to the patient of her duties, which may
chotherapist-patient privilege to apply, he could not bar admission of the statement at trial;
defendant knew when he made statement that it would be forwarded to putative targets, giv-
en that under state law the therapist had a duty to warn managers and patient had been re-
peatedly told by therapist during therapy that his violent threats would be communicated to
the potential victims).
45 See United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the defen-
dant did not waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege by continuing to talk to therapists
about his desire to kill his boss, a federal official, after being told of the therapist's duty to
protect; information on duty to protect was not a warning that therapist might assist in testi-
fying against his patient and might assist in procuring a conviction and incarceration).
46 See United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 987-89 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that although
a criminal defendant's psychiatrist properly disclosed threats that defendant had related to
him during therapy sessions regarding specific individuals, federal psychotherapist-patient
privilege precluded psychiatrist 's testimony about what defendant said to therapist during
sessions; there is no dangerous patient exception to the federal psychotherapist-patient testi-
monial privilege).
47 See United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that de-
fendant charged with threatening life of President of the United States could invoke psycho-
therapist-patient privilege to protect confidential communication made by defendant to the-
rapist in course of seeking treatment; evidentiary hearing was required to determine whether
threat of harm was serious when uttered by defendant to therapist and could be averted by
disclosure, such that compelled disclosure of the communication was warranted).
48 Auster, 517 F3d. at 315.
8
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include warning any possible victims and testifying against the pa-
tient in court. 49 There is a case to be made for putting this notice in
writing, at least in certain cases, and have its receipt recorded simul-
taneously with its delivery. Of course, the warning should be com-
municated in a way which accounts for the patient's level of under-
standing. There will necessarily be cases where the patient does not
have the capacity to grasp the meaning of the therapist's warning.
This may involve getting the requisite consent from a guardian or
similar representative.
B. The Crime-Fraud Exception
There is also a crime-fraud exception to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.so It arises in Medicaid fraud, Medicare fraud, and
personal injury cases.51 For example, the psychotherapist and the pa-
tient create a scenario about how impaired a person should be as a re-
sult of the tort, which results in wrongful conduct by both sides. If
you can establish a crime-fraud exception with the psychotherapist-
patient relationship, you may be able to invade the privilege.52
C. The "Unlicensed but Qualified Person" Exception
It is common knowledge that Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA")
is primarily run by laypeople. In fact, a popular perception is that
AA is one of the most effective ways of dealing with alcoholics and
49 Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/under
standing/summary/privacysummary.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
50 In re Violette, 183 F.3d 71, 76-77 (1st Cir. 1999) ("In the psychotherapist-patient con-
text, we likewise should exclude from the privilege communications made in furtherance of
crime or fraud because the mental health benefits, if any, of protecting such communications
pale in comparison to 'the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth.").
5' Id. at 77 ("Psychotherapists could use the privilege to deflect investigations into health
insurance fraud. Similarly, fraudulent personal injury cases could find effective refuge under
the umbrella of the privilege.").
52 The attorney-client privilege can be broken if the attorney and the client, together or
separately, are involved in a criminal conspiracy or similar act, so that the services of the
attorney are not really for the rendition of legal advice, but rather to figure out how the legal
system can be circumvented for the purposes of committing a crime. See, e.g., United States
v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-65 (1989) ("It is the purpose of the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege to assure the 'seal of secrecy,' between lawyer and client does not
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getting somebody to stop drinking, at least for the time they have a
relationship with AA.5 The problem arises because laypeople are
not licensed to perform counseling or psychotherapy functions.
However, there is a growing body of law that would recognize AA
"patient communications," but it is uncertain and the courts are di-
vided.54 In this instance, legislation would be helpful to clarify the
problem.
D. Implied Waivers
The Second Circuit recently decided Sims v. Blot.ss The issue
concerned what constitutes waiver of the psychotherapist-patient re-
lationship within a § 1983 lawsuit when plaintiff claims emotional
distress damages. 56 A plaintiff may request generalized damages that
typically accompany an injury, say during or following the applica-
tion of excessive force, for example, fear or anxiety. These are re-
ferred to as garden variety emotional distress damages. On the other
hand, plaintiffs may assert more profound emotional distress damag-
es such as serious depression, suicidal ideation, or similar significant
emotional injuries. Depending on how plaintiff pleads the emotional
distress damages and what she says in discovery, she may or may not
waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The issue is one of
fairness to the defendant. The more serious the claimed emotional
harm, the greater the likelihood that the privilege has been waived.
After all, a defendant exposed to significant monetary damages
should be able to test the merits of a serious emotional distress claim,
including obtaining the pertinent therapy records and examining the
psychotherapist. But the clear holding of the Sims case is that garden
variety emotional distress does not, by itself, trigger a waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
5 See Information on AA, www.aa.org. (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
54 See Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2002).
5 Sims v. Blot, No. 09-2060-pr, 2009 WL 4072116 (2d Cir. Nov. 25, 2009).
56 Id. at *1 ("This action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises out of an altercation between Sims
and the defendant-appellees, both guards at the prison.").
5 Id at *2.
58 id.
It does not appear that the testimony focused on Sims's psychiatric histo-
ry . . . the references in the closing argument were related to the defen-
dant's theory of motive. The district court appears to have weighed the
[Vol. 26588
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There are variant cases of Sims where, for example, during the
course of litigation, practitioners may conference with the judge, and
the judge may suggest that the emotional distress claim is weak. As
such, the practitioners must decide whether to prosecute the emotion-
al distress claim or relinquish it. In dealing with a § 1983 litigation,
there are few cases that have awarded substantial amounts of money
for emotional distress.5 9 Substantial money awards have been given
for back pay, attorney fees, and other things, but emotional distress
has not historically received great awards. 60  Nevertheless, some
practitioners press the issue and sometimes, but not often, win large
awards for emotional distress.61
Sims holds that the plaintiff may have an opportunity to with-
draw one aspect of the damages claim, which is often the emotional
distress claim. In other words, if the court says, "You are going to
have to give up the psychotherapist privilege because you crossed the
line and you are talking about severe emotional distress and depres-
sion," there is an opportunity to relinquish that part of your claim and
avoid revelations, which may be personally embarrassing or result in
other objectionable consequences. Regardless, the court may-due
to the existing conditions of the pleadings-find that the privilege
was waived. This situation is beneficial to defense counsel because,
at least, the emotional distress claim has been dropped. It is also im-
portant to note that depending on the nature of communication with
the therapist, the communication might be sufficiently embarrassing
to get the plaintiff to withdraw that aspect of the complaint.
prejudice against probative value, as required; it was not in error in ad-
mitting this evidence.
Id.
s9 See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978) (holding that students suspended
from public elementary and secondary schools without procedural due process were entitled
to recover only nominal damages).
60 See, e.g., Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 959 (4th Cir. 1988) (awarding damages in
the amount of $3680, despite finding that Sevigny suffered extreme emotional distress).
61 See, e.g., Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208, 209 (1998) (awarding damag-
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II. ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND GOVERNMENT
ATTORNEYS
The leading case in this area is Upjohn Co. v. United States.62
Upjohn is a private sector case decided in 1981. It involved the ap-
plication of the attorney-client privilege to officers serving at differ-
ent levels of the hierarchy within a corporation.63 Prior to Upjohn,
there was a doctrine called "the control group test," meaning if a per-
son were high enough in the corporation, communications with the
corporation's attorney were protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.64 Upjohn expanded the scope of this rule, and now an attorney
can claim a communicative privilege with anybody in the hierarchy
of the corporation. 65 The Upjohn doctrine has been incorporated into
municipal cases, at least with regard to civil litigation, almost com-
pletely.66
There are four elements to Upjohn: (1) the communication
with the attorney must be made and authorized by corporate supervi-
sors; (2) the purpose of the communication is to secure, or give legal
advice; (3) the communication involves activities within the scope of
the lower level employee's job; and (4) there is an understanding that
the material and the communications would be kept confidential.
Problems in applying Upjohn arise in suits against municipali-
ties and other governmental entities. Government officials are fre-
quently very informal with the way they communicate with the attor-
neys. For instance, the superintendent of schools, the assistant
superintendent, and a few principals may communicate with the
school board attorney at a school board meeting. There are likely
other people in the room during the alleged attorney-client communi-
cation who may be outside the scope of the communication network
that is privileged. The presence of these lower echelon employees, if
62 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
3Id. at 3 86.
SId at 391-92.
65 Id at 397 ("[Wle conclude that that narrow 'control group test' . . . cannot, consistent
with 'the principles of common law as . . . interpreted .. . in the light of reason and expe-
rience,' govern the development of the law in this area.").
66 See Nancy Leong, Attorney-Client Privilege in the Public Sector: A Survey of Govern-
ment Attorneys, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 163, 179 (2007) (noting that as a result of Upjohn,
corporate attorney-client privilege has become "firmly entrenched in legal doctrine").
61 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394.
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they are not needed for the rendition of the legal advice or if the pur-
pose of the attorney's communications falls outside their job duties,
may result in a failure to establish the attorney-client privilege, or a
waiver of the privilege, depending on the particular circumstances.68
As a result, a plaintiff may be able to procure the information that
was disclosed during the course of the communications.
As another example, assume the town attorney, the town po-
litical leader, and the union representatives were at a bar talking
about an employee they wanted to fire who was related to the super-
visor, the town's chief executive officer. Everybody present may as-
sume that because they are talking to the town attorney, the commu-
nication is privileged. However, it is not likely going to be privileged
because some of the people present are outside the permissible loop
to retain the privilege.69 In other words, a third party who attends the
meeting may not have received the confidential information with ap-
propriate board authority, for the purpose of securing legal advice, or
in connection with activities within the scope of the third party's
government employment, which may result in a waiver.70 As a re-
sult, the attorney can be forced to disclose those conversations, which
can be politically embarrassing and perhaps devastating to a pending
lawsuit. Thus, attorneys involved in municipal litigation who want to
get this type of information should look at the hierarchy and relation-
ships of those present at the meetings. The exclusion or inclusion of
someone in the conversation may determine whether the communica-
tions were privileged.
An issue also arises in the context of local boards in determin-
ing who is the client, with the town board being a separate entity. In
New York, for example, a town board typically consists of five indi-
viduals, including the town supervisor.7 1 Who can waive the privi-
lege on the board's behalf. 72 If one member of the town board de-
68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79 (2000) ("[The] attor-




71 See, e.g., Jeff Leibowitz, Manmade Ponds Called Peril, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1985, at
1 ILI (noting that the Town Board of Smithtown consists of five members).
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76, Comment G (2000).
[A] member is not authorized to waive the privilege for another mem-
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cides she is going to speak out and disclose what was said in confe-
rence in executive session, does that constitute a waiver? Did that
individual, being one of five, have the authority to waive, and is that
unauthorized communication something that should be held against
the municipality? The law is pretty clear: the attorney-client privi-
lege belongs to the entity.73
Another difficulty arises in multiple-defendant cases where
both the municipality and individuals associated with the entity are
sued. The leading case on this issue is Ross v. Memphis.74  The
§ 1983 defendant, who was sued individually, claimed good faith and
"advice of counsel" in his attempt to mitigate damages. The court
said that it is not the individual employee's right to waive the privi-
lege because the waiver privilege belongs to the government entity.76
Since the municipality refused to waive the privilege the individual
defendant could not present evidence he wished to reveal. Therefore,
one has to examine the relationships among the government person-
nel to discover whether or not the government gave that employee
protection by assigning its attorney to the particular individual. It is
the employee's responsibility to clarify this relationship, not the gov-
ernment. Courts will assume the privilege in such situations belongs
to the municipality.
munications from two or more members, a waiver is effective only if
concurred in by all members whose communications are involved, unless
an objecting member's communication can be redacted.
Id.
7 See Matthew Altemeier, Rethinking Selective Waiver: The Argument for Mandatory
Disclosure, 28 REv. LITIG. 629, 651 n. 111 (2009) (noting that the privilege belongs to the
corporation and not to the employee).
7 423 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2005).
7 Id. at 598-99 ("Relying on [his attorneys'] advice, Crews claimed, he decided to pro-
ceed with Ross's hearing. Crews argues that his reliance on their advice renders his behavior
reasonable, thus entitling him to a defense of qualified immunity.").
76 Id. at 605 ("Crews certainly could not assert that he relied on privileged communica-
tions and then hide behind the privilege, if he ever had it. But it is the City that holds the
privilege to these communications.").
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